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Infectious diseases play a unique role in perpetuat-
ing state weakness, as well as creating security threats 
for other nations. Indonesia makes a remarkable case 
study for the examination of the role of infectious dis-
eases in middle states with weak institutions. The coun-
try found itself in the middle of a global controversy 
regarding the novel Southeast Asian highly pathogenic 
influenza A (HPAI H5N1) virus in 2007. At that time, 
the virus just described was emerging in Southeast Asia. 
An avian influenza virus, it had made the interspecies 
jump to human infectivity, but not yet to sustained hu-
man-to-human transmission. Because it was found to be 
highly pathogenic, with significant associated morbidity 
and mortality within Indonesia, concerns were high re-
garding the potential of a pandemic. However, despite 
initial cooperation with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) regarding pandemic preparedness, Indonesia 
abruptly altered course and withheld virus samples from 
WHO labs, igniting a global firestorm as epidemiologists 
were concerned the Indonesian virus in particular could 
lead to a pandemic. 
This article will explore how Indonesia withheld virus 
samples because of an underlying distrust of Western 
institutions. This relationship resulted from serial neg-
ative encounters with Western institutions, beginning 
in the 1600’s with the highly extractive Dutch East India 
Company and continuing until as recently as 1997 with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
(WB) during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. 
Two Indonesias
Although Indonesia is considered a relatively strong 
state by the Index of State Weakness, (ranking 77 out of 
141 in 2008) and by the current health of its economy, it’s 
World Bank and United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) health care indicators are on par with other low-
er-middle income developing nations. In fact, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Strategy for Indonesia 2014-2018 describes “Two Indo-
nesias.” It outlines the growing income inequality in In-
donesia, with the richest twenty percent of the popula-
tion owning eighty percent of the wealth, and half of the 
population living on less than two dollars a day. 
Indonesia was particularly hard-hit by the avian Influ-
enza A H5N1 pandemic. According the WHO’s Disease 
Outbreak News in January 2014, Indonesia experienced 
a total of 195 documented infections, with 163 deaths. 
A British Medical Journal (BMJ) Public Health article 
in 2013 noted at that time the case fatality rate was 83%, 
almost twenty percent higher than similarly affected 
countries. Worldwide documented cases from the start 
of the outbreak through January 2014 totaled 650 with 
386 deaths. The hardest hit countries were Indonesia 
(numbers stated above), Egypt (173 cases, 63 deaths), 
Vietnam (125 cases, 62 deaths), and China (45 cases, 30 
deaths).
Because of its status as a developing nation with rela-
tively weak public health institutions, public health 
threats such as avian influenza H5N1, emerging from 
Indonesia could potentially be associated with an in-
effective response. Shortcomings in Indonesia’s institu-
tions play a major role in the dangers of emerging in-
fectious diseases. These include corruption in political 
institutions, health care system inequities that favor the 
rich, public health deficiencies both in veterinary and 
human health, and cultural distrust of Western institu-
tions such as the WHO, the World Bank, and the IMF. 
This distrust played out during the H5N1 outbreak. In 
an unprecedented move, Indonesia withheld their viral 
samples from the WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network (GISN), claiming ecologic sovereignty over 
the virus type due to a distrust of Western institutions. 
Biopiracy and Neo-Colonialism
While Indonesia did eventually decide to share vi-
ral samples with the GISN, their distrust was validat-
ed when an Australian vaccine manufacturer (who 
Misdiagnosis:
Dysfunction between western health 
organizations and developing nations
Fall 2015 | 26
had obtained samples of the Indonesian virus from the 
WHO) approached the Indonesian government offering 
to sell the vaccine. Indonesia felt that this was another 
example of western powerstrying to keep developing na-
tions hostage. An intense legal battle gave rise to a new 
term in global governance, “biopiracy.” Indonesia’s fear 
was that a vaccine was being developed using their H5N1 
samples by the Australian company, who would then at-
tempt to sell it targeting their strain of H5N1 at unaf-
fordable prices during a national emergency (such as an 
epidemic). Unavailability of the vaccine in Indonesia led 
to a perception that they were living in a “sacrifice zone”, 
in which the Indonesian population was being ignored 
at the expense of protecting wealthy nations. Indonesia 
felt this amounted to blackmail and was representative 
of western interna-
tional regimes holding 
economic power over 
developing nations. 
This added insult to 
injury as the coun-
try was also dealing 
with the highest case-
load of human-avian 
flu at that time. Fur-
thermore, Indonesia’s 
Health Minister had 
difficulty obtaining 
oseltamir, the only 
known effective treat-
ment for influenza A, 
because worldwide stockpiles were unavailable due to 
alleged hoarding of the drug by wealthy nations. These 
events led Indonesia to reconsider what they were gain-
ing from participating in the global health surveillance 
system. Indonesia’s Health Ministry decided once again 
to stop sharing virus samples, claiming that the use of 
their virus to patent a vaccine to which they did not have 
access violated the principle of ecologic sovereignty. This 
placed the country in violation of both Indonesia’s Mate-
rial Transport Agreement (MTA) and local regulations. 
Western institutions, including the WHO, the CDC, and 
the ECDC explained discrepancies in vaccine availability 
in several ways. The first was on the basis of epidemio-
logic factors. Targets for vaccine coverage are those peo-
ple who meet eligibility criteria for high risk, including 
the elderly, and those with chronic medical conditions. 
Western countries argued that they receive higher cov-
erage with vaccination stockpiles because they have the 
largest populations meeting those criteria. They added 
that many of these same countries have pharmaceutical 
presence able to produce the vaccines locally. They fur-
ther asserted that the effects of seasonal influenza out-
breaks are not well-studied in developing nations, thus 
there is not a documented need for seasonal flu vaccine 
in those countries. Finally, they insisted that withhold-
ing virus samples was in violation of international law, 
specifically an International Health Regulation signed 
at the World Health Assembly in 2005 (IHR 2005). As 
far as the vaccine manufacturer was concerned, the 
WHO insisted that 
issue was between 
the Indonesian gov-
ernment and the vac-
cine manufacturer.
In the end, Indonesia 
successfully claimed 
that IHR 2005 was 
not binding until 
it officially entered 
force on June 15, 
2007, which was af-
ter the controversy 
started and the sam-
ples were held. Fur-
thermore, they argued that while the regulation was 
designed to facilitate sharing information, it did not 
include biologic samples. Thus, even though the IHR 
was not officially in effect, they still had not violated the 
voluntary obligation expressed in the law. 
However, the larger question remains. How can a global 
response to a pandemic that could potentially require 
up to six billion vaccine doses be possible?  Less-de-
veloped countries, especially those with infant scientific 
or pharmaceutical industries, are ill-equipped to devel-
op and distribute influenza vaccines on an emergency 
basis. Furthermore, some countries, as is the case with 
Indonesia, do not trust western institutions to meet 
their needs in cases of wider global epidemics. In fact, 
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each clade, some clades may be more 
pathogenic in humans versus others, 
resulting in more profound morbidity 
and/or higher mortality. 
This information is critical to pan-
demic preparedness and vaccine de-
velopment because vaccines must be 
tailored to the clade with the highest 
pathogenicity. Furthermore, some 
clades may have a higher antigenicity 
(the ability to induce antibodies) and 
therefore make more effective vaccine 
preparations. Researchers and manu-
facturers need access to as many clades 
as possible to design a vaccine that 
effectively both produces antibodies 
with the fewest doses possible (ideally 
only a single thermo-stable dose) and 
targets the most pathogenic clade(s).
H5N1 is a subtype of avian influenza A that has crossed 
species to infect not only birds, but also humans. It is a 
type of virus known collectively as a “zoonoses”- any or-
ganism (virus, bacteria, parasites et cetera) whose known 
hosts are non-human vertebrates. Close and sustained 
contact between people and the usual host organism, 
birds, can result in infection in humans. Molecular iden-
tification of the viral genome in the case of H5N1 was 
found to have originated in wild fowl in China where it 
infected domesticated chickens. Subtypes of this virus 
were eventually proven to be identical between infect-
ed humans and poultry in the case of multiple countries 
across Eurasia, including Vietnam and Indonesia, prov-
ing it had crossed species. 
Differences between virus families are known as “clades”. 
In the case of H5N1, several clades were identified and 
mapped, allowing epidemiologists to track the spread of 
particular viral families (such as those descending into 
Vietnam and Thailand, versus those found in Indone-
sia). Because of peculiarities to the genetic code held in 
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The international health regime has evolved over time to 
include free and prompt sharing of new viruses to inter-
national health agencies in order to study and develop 
vaccines as needed pre-emptively. The primary agencies 
are: the WHO, which is associated with the United Na-
tions; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in the United States; and the European Centre 
for Disease for Prevention and Control (ECDC). These 
agencies work in conjunction with the Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network (GISN) to survey for and geneti-
cally categorize novel influenza viruses.  The goal is to 
identify potentially epidemic strains at their source and 
activate the so-called “Rapid Containment Strategy” to 
keep the virus from spreading outside its zone of origin. 
These agencies are especially concerned about influen-
za viruses because they have known pandemic ability, 
as evidenced by Spanish Influenza that resulted in more 
than thirty million deaths worldwide. But the entire re-
gime hinges on rapid typing of novel strains, which can 
only be accomplished though timely participation in the 
GISN, so the containment strategy can be activated. 
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should include transparency in policy and processes.
3. View these opportunities as chances for further insti-
tutional and economic development. Offer training to lo-
cal health care personnel in both veterinary and human 
medical disease surveillance and intervention. Avoid 
creating parallel systems by not allowing foreign actors 
(NGO’s etc.) to solely perform these duties. Instead, work 
with existing infrastructure and governments to build 
institutions locally and prevent brain drain by creating 
employment opportunities in the home country.
4. Make an effort to understand local cultural and histor-
ical context so solutions will be as seamless as possible. 
Be sensitive to these contexts in an effort to avoid pa-
ternalistic tendencieswhile seeking consensus regarding 
global issues.
Conclusion
Infectious diseases are increasingly recognized as threats 
to national security. Indonesia is a contemporary and 
compelling study of the multiple and sometimes dispa-
rate relationships between public health and geopoliti-
cal interests. First, Indonesia displays the cultural norms 
that allow close proximity and spread of the avian influ-
enza virus to human populations as well as the weak and 
underfunded health care infrastructure that is unable to 
care for the ill and infected. Second, it is a nation bearing 
the collective memory of a long-lasting colonial occupa-
tion, and perceives that her national sovereignty contin-
ues to be undermined at the hands of global governance 
agencies. Global institutions such as the World Bank and 
WHO either intentionally or unwittingly hindered ef-
forts at full integration of Indonesia into global economic 
and governance regimes. Third, Indonesia’s demographic 
challenges as the fourth most populous nation, strategi-
cally located in the heart of global shipping lanes, placed 
an enormous strain on her governance structures during 
an effort to treat an epidemic within her borders and to 
inhibit the epidemic’s spread to other regions. Finally, all 
of the above factors support the case that both national 
security and public health threats are culture specific. A 
case-specific paradigm must be developed so that all of 
these issues can be addressed to acheive a desirable out-
come.
in 2010, a review of seasonal vaccine (H1N1) availabil-
ity by Khoon showed these worries to be valid. Despite 
the global vaccine manufacturer’s promise to provide 
poor nations with a stockpile of 120 million doses, 
those pledges could not be fulfilled until months after 
the pandemic had waned. Meanwhile, wealthy nations 
who had been able to pre-order doses were provided 
with the first billion produced. Thus, Indonesia (and 
other developing nations) perceive themselves to be in 
a precarious and dangerous situation, providing the vi-
ruses that may herald a coming pandemic, yet unable to 
obtain vaccinations until too late. However, as Margaret 
Chan, Director General of the WHO argues, the global 
community is at risk when global cooperation in sur-
veillance and planning is not achieved. 
Policy Solutions
There are several policy options that can assist interna-
tional cooperation between developing countries, like 
Indonesia, as well as promote increased cooperation 
between global institutions, such as the WHO, and the 
nations they claim to help. 
1. Continue dialogue, including listening to complaints 
from developing countries regarding global governance 
and sincerely attempt to remedy those complaints. The 
WHO did this in their pandemic preparedness plan by 
having multiple meetings with all the stakeholders, but 
in the future this should be accomplished successfully 
in less than four years.
2. Involve countries in all steps of pandemic prepared-
ness so they can have ownership over the process, in-
cluding assurances that vaccine and/or treatment will 
be available within an acceptable time frame. This 
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